If you have any interest in philosophy of mind and/or theories of statutory interpretation, you will love Richard Murphy’s NeuroCongress. From the abstract:
This mercifully brief excursion into philosophy of (congressional) mind starts with the premise that, although it is common to speak of legislative intent, an entity cannot form an intent without a mind to generate it. For those of a speculative bent who find themselves in work-avoidance mode, this observation may spark questions concerning the mind/legislative-body problem. These questions apply broadly to all legislative bodies, but, without loss of generality and for ease of reference, one can focus them on Congress. Could Congress have a mind of its own? If it does, what is the qualitative nature of its mental experience – i.e., with due apologies to Professor Nagel, what is it like to be Congress? And what can reflection on the nature of such experience teach us about congressional intent?
Murphy here (as in person) is altogether too self-effacing–this piece is really an exemplar of the Lucretian style of instruction via entertainment. Kudos to him for bringing some high philosophy and law together in an approachable manner, and to my school’s law review for publishing it!