The Boston Phoenix has an article about what Facebook coughs up when a subpoena is sent to the company. The paper came across the material as it worked on an article called Hunting the Craigslist Killer. The issues that come to mind for me are
1. Privacy after death? In may article Property, Persona, and Preservation which uses the question of who owns email after death, I argue that privacy after death isn’t tenable. The release of information after someone dies (the man committed suicide), (From ZDNET “he man committed suicide, which meant the police didnâ€™t care if the Facebook document was published elsewhere, after robbing two women and murdering a third.”) brings up a question Dan Solove and I have debated. What about those connected to the dead person? The facts here matter.
2. What are reasons to redact or not release information? Key facts about redaction and public records complicate the question of death and privacy. I’m assuming the person has no privacy after death. But his or her papers may reveal information about those connected to the dead person. In this case the police did not redact, but the paper did. Sort of.
This document was publicly released by Boston Police as part of the case file. In other case documents, the police have clearly redacted sensitive information. And while the police were evidently comfortable releasing Markoffâ€™s unredacted Facebook subpoena, we werenâ€™t. Markoff may be dead, but the very-much-alive friends in his friend list were not subpoenaed, and yet their full names and Facebook IDâ€™s were part of the document. So we took the additional step of redacting as much identifying information as we could â€” knowing that any redaction we performed would be imperfect, but believing that thereâ€™s a strong argument for distributing this, not only for its value in illustrating the Markoff case, but as a rare window into the shadowy process by which Facebook deals with law enforcement.
As the comments noted and the explanation admits, the IDs and other information of the living are arguably in greater need of protection. It may have been that the police needed all the information for its case, but why release it to the public?
Obvious Closing: As we put more into the world, it will come back in ways we had not imagined. I doubt that bright line rules will ever work in this space. But it seems to me that some sort of best practices informed by research (think Lior Strahilevitz’s A Social Networks Theory of Privacy) could allow for reasonable, useful privacy practices. The hardest part for law and society in general is that this area (information-related law) is not likely to be stable for some time. That being said, I think that the insane early domain name law (yes someone could think that megacorpsucks.com is sponsored by megacorp) corrected in about 10 years. Perhaps privacy and information practices will reach an equilibrium that allows the law to stabilize. Until then, practices, businesses, science, and the law will twirl around each other as society sorts what balance makes sense (until something messes with that moment).