What Problems Should We Be Solving?
First published: November 3, 2025. Posted here for archival purposes.
“Everything in Between” is about the systems, institutions, and practices that people build, “things” of a sort that sit in between us, between groups of us, between “us” and “them,” and between us and other systems and institutions that seem terribly far away: “the market,” “the state,” the universe, and so on.
Amid the many advancing manifestations of AI in higher education and the frequent calls for re-focusing universities’ instructional programs on versions of “critical thinking” in multiple contexts, I thought it possibly useful simply to reproduce the text of one the key foundational texts directed to the proposition that the central aim of student’s undergraduate education is to participate in what has long been called a “liberal education.” There is, in a way, nothing truly new under the sun.
What follows is the central passage from the Yale Report of 1828.
Given its age and given the elite status of its institutional origin, the report has long been celebrated. In New Haven, university leaders invoke its central message today in both public and private settings. (I know because I’ve heard them do it.) The celebration has been complemented by equally robust critique – John Belushi’s Bluto and his fellow Dionysian undergraduates being perhaps the most profanely on point. This post isn’t the place to collect and present the most notable versions of either one, but perhaps I’ll do that down the proverbial road.
A scan (pdf) of the original report is available here. The full text has been cleaned up and shared online in multiple places, including this one and this one. This is, I think, the key passage for present purposes, the statement of values that may link antiquated learning environments with the best of modern ones. What we do with universities today should have something directly to do with why we have universities today. “What problems are we solving?” is a question that university faculty were asking themselves 200 years ago.
What then is the appropriate object of a college? It is not necessary here to determine what it is which, in every case, entitles an institution to the name of a college. But if we have not greatly misapprehended the design of the patrons and guardians of this college, its object is to lay the foundation of a superior education: and this is to be done, at a period of life when a substitute must be provided for parental superintendence. The ground work of a thorough education, must be broad, and deep, and solid. For a partial or superficial education, the support may be of looser materials, and more hastily laid.
The two great points to be gained in intellectual culture, are the discipline and the furniture of the mind; expanding its powers, and storing it with knowledge. The former of these is, perhaps, the more important of the two. A commanding object, therefore, in a collegiate course, should be, to call into daily and vigorous exercise the faculties of the student. Those branches of study should be prescribed, and those modes of instruction adopted, which are best calculated to teach the art of fixing the attention, directing the train of thought, analyzing a subject proposed for investigation; following, with accurate discrimination, the course of argument; balancing nicely the evidence presented to the judgment; awakening, elevating, and controlling the imagination; arranging, with skill, the treasures which memory gathers; rousing and guiding the powers of genius. All this is not to be effected by a light and hasty course of study; by reading a few books, hearing a few lectures, and spending some months at a literary institution. The habits of thinking are to be formed, by long continued and close application. The mines of science must be penetrated far below the surface, before they will disclose their treasures. If a dexterous performance of the manual operations, in many of the mechanical arts, requires an apprenticeship, with diligent attention for years; much more does the training of the powers of the mind demand vigorous, and steady, and systematic effort.
In laying the foundation of a thorough education, it is necessary that all the important mental faculties be brought into exercise. It is not sufficient that one or two be cultivated, while others are neglected. A costly edifice ought not to be left to rest upon a single pillar. When certain mental endowments receive a much higher culture than others, there is a distortion in the intellectual character. The mind never attains its full perfection, unless its various powers are so trained as to give them the fair proportions which nature designed. If the student exercises his reasoning powers only, he will be deficient in imagination and taste, in fervid and impressive eloquence. If he confines his attention to demonstrative evidence, he will be unfitted to decide correctly, in cases of probability. If he relies principally on his memory, his powers of invention will be impaired by disuse. In the course of instruction in this college, it has been an object to maintain such a proportion between the different branches of literature and science, as to form in the student a proper balance of character. From the pure mathematics, he learns the art of demonstrative reasoning. In attending to the physical sciences, he becomes familiar with facts, with the process of induction, and the varieties of probable evidence. In ancient literature, he finds some of the most finished models of taste. By English reading, he learns the powers of the language in which he is to speak and write. By logic and mental philosophy, he is taught the art of thinking; by rhetoric and oratory, the art of speaking. By frequent exercise on written composition, he acquires copiousness and accuracy of expression. By extemporaneous discussion, he becomes prompt, and fluent, and animated. It is a point of high importance, that eloquence and solid learning should go together; that he who has accumulated the richest treasures of thought, should possess the highest powers of oratory. To what purpose has a man become deeply learned, if he has no faculty of communicating his knowledge? And of what use is a display of rhetorical elegance, from one who knows little or nothing which is worth communicating? Est enim scientia comprehendenda rerum plurimarum, sine qua verborum volubilitas inanis atque irridenda est. Cic. Our course, therefore, aims at a union of science with literature; of solid attainment with skill in the art of persuasion.
No one feature in a system of intellectual education, is of greater moment than such an arrangement of duties and motives, as will most effectually throw the student upon the resources of his own mind. Without this, the whole apparatus of libraries, and instruments, and specimens, and lectures, and teachers, will be insufficient to secure distinguished excellence. The scholar must form himself, by his own exertions. The advantages furnished by a residence at a college, can do little more than stimulate and aid his personal efforts. The inventive powers are especially to be called into vigorous exercise. However abundant may be the acquisitions of the student, if he has no talent at forming new combinations of thought, he will be dull and inefficient. The sublimest efforts of genius consist in the creations of the imagination, the discoveries of the intellect, the conquests by which the dominions of science are extended. But the culture of the inventive faculties is not the only object of a liberal education. The most gifted understanding cannot greatly enlarge the amount of science to which the wisdom of ages has contributed. If it were possible for a youth to have his faculties in the highest state of cultivation, without any of the knowledge which is derived from others, he would be but poorly fitted for the business of life. To the discipline of the mind, therefore, is to be added instruction. The analytic method must be combined with the synthetic. Analysis is most efficacious in directing the powers of invention; but is far too slow in its progress to teach, within a moderate space of time, the circle of the sciences.
In our arrangements for the communication of knowledge, as well as in intellectual discipline, such branches are to be taught as will produce a proper symmetry and balance of character. We doubt whether the powers of the mind can be developed, in their fairest proportions, by studying languages alone, or mathematics alone, or natural or political science alone. As the bodily frame is brought to its highest perfection, not by one simple and uniform motion, but by a variety of exercises; so the mental faculties are expanded, and invigorated, and adapted to each other, by familiarity with different departments of science.
A most important feature in the colleges of this country is, that the students are generally of an age which requires, that a substitute be provided for parental superintendence. When removed from under the roof of their parents, and exposed to the untried scenes of temptation, it is necessary that some faithful and affectionate guardian take them by the hand, and guide their steps. This consideration determines the kind of government which ought to be maintained in our colleges. As it is a substitute for the regulations of a family, it should approach as near to the character of parental control as the circumstances of the case will admit. It should be founded on mutual affection and confidence. It should aim to effect its purpose, principally by kind and persuasive influence; not wholly or chiefly by restraint and terror. Still, punishment may sometimes be necessary. There may be perverse members of a college, as well as of a family. There may be those whom nothing but the arm of law can reach.
The parental character of college government, requires that the students should be so collected together, as to constitute one family; that the intercourse between them and their instructers may be frequent and familiar. This renders it necessary that suitable buildings be provided, for the residence of the students:—we speak now of colleges in the country, the members of which are mostly gathered from a distance. In a large city, where the students may reside with their parents, public rooms only are needed. This may be the case also, in professional institutions, in which the students are more advanced in age, and, therefore, do not require a minute superintendence on the part of their instructers.
What others have to say
Selections from new-ish commentary about the institutions of higher education and institutions of expertise, shared because these folks have me thinking, not necessarily because I agree.
Henry Jenkins at Programmable Mutter, “What is civil society, and why should we care? Ernest Gellner on the conditions of liberty”:
[Quoting Gellner: ‘Civil Society is a cluster of institutions and associations strong enough to prevent tyranny, but which are, none the less, entered and left freely, rather than imposed by birth or sustained by awesome ritual….”] From this perspective, civil society is a crucial underpinning of the kinds of social order that welds together democracy and markets. According to classical liberal influenced political economists such as the late Doug North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry Weingast, it is the most important distinguishing characteristic between the “closed orders” of ancient and modern authoritarian states, and the “open access orders” that preserve liberalism. According to more left-of-center political economists such as Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, a strong civil society is a crucial protection against tyranny. Both of these strains of thought lay heavy emphasis on the essential role that democracy plays in supporting to free societies. Open civil society and democratic institutions are inseparable from each other, although Gellner liked to insist that democracy emerged from civil society rather than vice versa.
Equally, Gellner argues that civil society is not a natural equilibrium. It came about through chance conditions – very possibly the conditions that Hume and Ferguson identified, perhaps others. It is in perpetual tension with nationalism, Gellner’s other great preoccupation (and the one he is most famous for writing on: his books on nationalism are still in print). A moderate nationalism can stabilize civil society; a radical nationalism will corrode it or attack it directly. Back in the early 1990s, Gellner was preoccupied with the conditions under which Central and Eastern Europe might rebuild civil society after Communism (he spent his last years teaching at the Central European University in Hungary). He feared that nationalism might again devour its sibling in the womb.
Jordan Furlong, “The new legal intelligence”:
LLMs do possess the capability of “legal intelligence” — in functional terms, they can learn, understand, and reason with legal rules and principles, and they can use that ability to assess, analyze, and solve legal problems. This is particularly true of law-specific programs like Vincent, CoCounsel, Harvey and others; but as the reports above confirm, it can also be said of general-purpose LLMs like ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini in many cases. These programs can generate legal output strikingly similar to the content lawyers produce using human legal intelligence.
Legal intelligence, once confined uniquely to lawyers, is now available from machines. That’s going to transform the legal sector.
Think of it this way: Picture your town or city from above, as if you’re looking down at a Google Maps display. Drop a red pushpin on the map for each lawyer below you, each human source of legal intelligence. Lots of little red pins would pop up, or maybe only a few, if (like many people) you’re in a region that’s short on lawyers.
Now drop a blue pin for every desktop, tablet, and smartphone that can run an LLM, either a general-purpose model like ChatGPT or a legally grounded model like Vincent. The entire map would flood blue with countless sources of artificial legal intelligence, vastly outnumbering the human sources in red.
Even if you were to count only the law-specific AIs, which conservatively are in regular use by a hundred thousand lawyers every month, the blue pins would at least rival the red — and they’re growing fast. And each blue pin on the map represents a standalone source of artificial legal intelligence, one that can mimic the results of a human lawyer’s legal reasoning much faster, much less expensively, 24/7/365.
That’s what’s happening to the legal market right now: the supply of legal intelligence is exploding. A valuable capability that used to be scarce is on its way to becoming ubiquitous. It’s not just that we’ve developed artificial legal intelligence, it’s that this capacity is scalable, portable, and accessible — three things that most human lawyers are not.
This is why I keep saying that lawyers’ best hope for future relevance is to focus on their human attributes — their capacity to form trusted relationships, to offer legally-informed but personally-inflected counsel, judgment, and wisdom. Legal intelligence is not going to be exclusive to humans. But intuition, integrity, and the ability to form trusted relationships will be. These human attributes are uniquely our own, and they’re impervious to AI mimicry. That’s where we need to start.
My bookshelf
Like a lot of academics, I read a lot. Like a lot of law professors, I read a lot about law and about governance. But I also read a lot of things just for fun and a lot of other things because you never know where interesting ideas might come from.
Just completed: Sarah A. Seo, “Policing the Open Road: How Cars Transformed American Freedom” (Harvard University Press, 2019).
The abstract, from the Harvard UP website:
When Americans think of freedom, they often picture the open road. Yet nowhere are we more likely to encounter the long arm of the law than in our cars. Sarah Seo reveals how the rise of the automobile led us to accept—and expect—pervasive police power, a radical transformation with far-reaching consequences.
Before the twentieth century, most Americans rarely came into contact with police officers. But in a society dependent on cars, everyone—law-breaking and law-abiding alike—is subject to discretionary policing. Seo challenges prevailing interpretations of the Warren Court’s due process revolution and argues that the Supreme Court’s efforts to protect Americans did more to accommodate than limit police intervention. Policing the Open Road shows how the new procedures sanctioned discrimination by officers, and ultimately undermined the nation’s commitment to equal protection before the law.
To me, the two most interesting features of the book are (one) its historical coverage, beginning with the responses of communities, public authorities, and (gulp) law professors to the profusion of automobiles that transformed American life during the 1910s and 1920 and (two) its reliance on the spirit of Willard Hurst, whose pioneering research on the effects of the automobile on society – and law – shines explicitly through Seo’s text. There’s a good case to be made, and Seo makes it, that the modern administrative state, with all of its many flaws, owes much of its origin to Henry Ford’s Model T. “Society and technology” studies were not invented by social science scholars in the 1970s or by 1990s law professors studying the internet. The field goes back to Hurst, at least.
Also: an addition! I can’t wait to get through the just-published “The Seven Rules of Trust: A Blueprint for Building Things That Last,” by Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales. Given Wikipedia’s famously semi-transparent character, it is a bit ironic that the text is not available in an OA format, so I’ll have to get it through my local public library.
I doubt very much that Jimmy Wales has shared any secrets about trust that aren’t already evident in the voluminous literature on the subject, let alone that he has successfully distilled them into seven “rules.” (At best, he has named what Captain Barbossa famously labeled “guidelines” rather actual rules.) But as someone who was both scholarly-conscious and human-conscious of the processes adjacent to Wikipedia’s birth and who, like many others, invoked Wikipedia in the past as a canonical illustration of knowledge commons governance, I am eager to read how Wales explains what he learned. Will he prove to be an unreliable narrator?
Thanks for sticking with me.